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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Netherlands has been frequently confronted with 
public incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. After defining 
the complex concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, presenting 
the theoretical approach to these phenomena, and sketching the 
societal context in which they are embedded, this article describes 
the development of the numbers of reported expressions of anti-
Semitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands since the turn of 
the century. It notes that the general level of annual numbers of 
recorded incidents of the phenomena has increased since 2000 and, 
at the same time, there are significant fluctuations in the numbers of 
notified incidents per year. These fluctuations correlate to outbursts of 
violence in the Middle East and to acts of violence committed in the 
name of Islam in the West, while the general higher level of incidents 
of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia relates to numerous and various 
threats experienced in the context of the Dutch multi-ethnic society, 
changes in national identity, and trends in globalisation.
Introduction
In recent years, the Netherlands has been frequently confronted with public incidents of 
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. In 2013, Turkish–Dutch youth declared without shame in a 
broadcast report that they had sympathy for Hitler because they, too, hated Jews (Onbevoegd 
gezag 2013). In the summer of 2014, there were chants of “Death to Israel, death to Jews” 
(NOS 2014) during pro-Gaza demonstrations. A recent research report revealed that a third 
of all Christian youth (34%) in the Netherlands and over a quarter of all non-believing youth 
(27%) do not think ‘so positively’ about Muslims, while one out of eight Muslim youth 
(12%) does not think ‘so positively’ about Jews (van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 92). 
Alongside these indications of anti-Semitism there are many indications of Islamophobia. 
On 27 February 2016, for instance, five men hurled Molotov cocktails against the wall of 
a mosque in Enschede. The five perpetrators, right-wing extremists, were convicted of a 
terrorist offence (Nagtegaal 2016). A few weeks later, on 17 March 2016, a pig’s head was 
found outside the El Fath Mosque in Berkel en Rodenrijs, near Rotterdam. According to 
the Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 
KEYWORDS
anti-Semitism; islamophobia; 
the netherlands; social 
identity; perceived threats; 
multi-ethnic society
ARTICLE HISTORY
received 23 July 2015 
accepted 7 august 2017
© 2018 the author(s). published by informa uK limited, trading as taylor & francis group.
this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribution-nonCommercial-noDerivatives license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Sipco Vellenga  s.j.vellenga@rug.nl
 OPEN ACCESS
176   S. VELLENGA
two thirds of Muslims (65%) in the Netherlands experience discrimination (Andriessen, 
Fernee, and Wittebrood 2014, 77). Furthermore, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV—Party 
for Freedom) continues criticising Islam and Muslims tirelessly. This party considers Islam 
not to be a religion but a malevolent ideology and strives for a rigorous restriction of the 
freedom of belief for Muslims in the Netherlands: a ban on the Koran, a ban on Islamic head 
scarves at public functions, and the closing of all mosques and Islamic schools (PVV 2017).1
To correct an erroneous image, current anti-Semitism in the Netherlands is not limited to 
Muslims or Muslim youth and, similarly, Islamophobia is not restricted to less well educated 
people. Recent surveys, conducted by the Research Centre Panteia in 2013 and 2015, on the 
size, character, and backgrounds of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in secondary 
education show that other categories are also involved. The surveys revealed that, in 2015, a 
large majority of teachers (61%) witnessed Islamophobic incidents in their classrooms, while 
more than one in three teachers (36%) observed expressions of anti-Semitism (Bouma and 
de Ruig 2015, 13; cf. Wolf, Berger, and de Ruig 2013, 13). Although pupils with Moroccan 
and Turkish backgrounds were over-represented among the perpetrators of anti-Semitic 
incidents, almost two out of three perpetrators (65%) had a native Dutch background (Wolf, 
Berger, and de Ruig 2013, 31). Despite the fact that Islamophobic incidents were, among all 
school types, found to be the highest in preparatory secondary vocational education (78%), 
just over half (51%) were noted in pre-university education (Bouma and de Ruig 2015, 20).
This article focuses on the question whether the numbers of (registered) incidents of 
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands have increased since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century or, formulated more openly, whether developments have taken 
place with regard to the numbers of these incidents. In addition, the article focuses on the 
way these developments could be understood and the factors which have influenced them.
In order to answer these two questions, the subsequent structure is followed. Firstly, the 
complexity of the concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is addressed as well as the 
manner in which these terms are used in this article. Moreover, scholarly approaches to 
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are expounded, that is, the perspectives of social identity, 
conflict, and mobilisation. Next, some features of the national and international context 
in which these phenomena are embedded are described, namely the development of a 
multi-ethnic and multicultural society in which religion counts as an important identity 
marker, the rise of a new national self-conception where the Netherlands is considered 
to be a progressive, predominantly secular society instead of a multicultural society, and 
the globalisation of regional conflicts. Subsequently, the development of the numbers 
of registered anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in the Netherlands since 2000 is 
described. In addition, an explanation is provided for these developments from the 
perspective developed in the theoretical section and taken into the context in which these 
developments take place. The article concludes with a note on the possible dynamics between 
the development of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
Concepts
The ‘classical’ definition of anti-Semitism is aversion to and prejudice against Jews as Jews 
(or because they are Jews) (cf. Feldman 2014, 5–8; Gans 2003, 1; Kushner 1989, 2–13). 
According to this characterisation, an attack on Jews, as Jews, is by definition anti-Semitic. 
Nevertheless, while this definition is attractive in its simplicity and clarity, there are some 
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problems associated with it (Klug 2013). One fundamental problem is that the term ‘Jews’ 
in the second part of the definition does actually not refer to ‘real’ Jews but to Jewish 
stereotypes, which is an elementary feature of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is not based on 
experiences with real Jews but generally on caricatures and prejudice about them. Precisely 
for this reason, the British philosopher Brian Klug characterises anti-Semitism as
a form of hostility towards Jews as Jews, in which Jews are perceived as something other than 
they are… Thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews’ is precisely the core of anti-Semitism. (Klug 
2003, 124–125; cf. Feldman 2013, 5–8; Klug 2013)
Consequently, anti-Semitism is defined in this article as aversion to Jews based on negative 
stereotypes and prejudice against Jews. Stereotypes are features which are considered to 
be characteristic of a collectivity, while prejudice is about global, negative feelings about 
the collectivity concerned (cf. Koomen and van der Pligt 2016, 12–36). In Dutch culture, 
negative stereotypes about Jews are still present. The study The Holocaust, Israel and ‘the Jew’ 
(Ensel and Gans 2017) shows that, in post-war Dutch society, old stereotypes of Jews, such 
as ‘the Christ Killer’, ‘the rich Jew’, and ‘the obscene Jew’, have been recycled and modified 
for new uses and, at the same time, new stereotypes have emerged which are attached to 
the Shoah or Holocaust and Israel. The new stereotypes often have a dualistic character:
the dual role of victim and perpetrator, victim of the Nazis and their collaborators during the 
Shoah, and perpetrator of injustices against the Palestinians in Israel and in Gaza and the West 
Bank (Ensel and Gans 2017, 49).
Islamophobia is, just like anti-Semitism, deeply rooted in European history (cf. Nielsen 
2004). In their study on the perception of Islam in the Netherlands in the period 1848–
2010, Marcel Poorthuis and Theo Salemink indicate that the current hostility towards Islam 
and Muslims is in line with a long tradition which is fuelled by several sources: negative 
reception of Islam by Christianity, the fight against the Saracens, Moors, and ‘Turks’, and 
racist theories developed in the age of colonialism (Poorthuis and Salemink 2011, 35–37). 
The term ‘Islamophobia’ has actually become more common due to the influence of the 
publication of the British think-tank The Runnymede Trust in 1997, entitled Islamophobia: 
A Challenge for Us All (Runnymede Trust 1997). This study defines Islamophobia as “the 
dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed 
views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims” 
(Runnymede Trust 1997, 7). While the term is now widely accepted and used, the manner 
in which it was espoused in this report has resulted in a long and heated debate (cf. Allen 
2010; Cesari 2006; López 2011). Most of the criticism is related to the following four points:
1. the restriction of the definition of the phenomenon to the emotional component of hatred 
and aversion; 2. the difficulty in making a distinction between a prejudiced attitude towards 
Islam and Muslims on the one hand, and justified criticism of the religion on the other; 3. the 
observation that discrimination is directed at Muslims and not at Islam; 4. the Trust’s approach 
towards Islam is to treat it as an essentialised whole and Muslims as a homogenous group in the 
same way that Islamophobic rhetoric, against which it is aimed, does. (van der Valk 2015a, 12)
A possible alternative to the term ‘Islamophobia’ would be ‘anti-Islamism’. However, the 
major disadvantage of that term is that the current concept of Islamism refers increasingly 
only to political Islam, which implies that ‘anti-Islamism’ is not an useful alternative. There 
are other possible terms to mention: ‘anti-Muslimism’, ‘anti-Muslim feelings’, ‘anti-Muslim 
racism’, and ‘Muslim discrimination’. However, a significant drawback of all these alternatives 
is that they are much less accepted in science, politics, and civil society than the term 
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‘Islamophobia’. For that practical reason, the term ‘Islamophobia’ is used, although I realise 
that it is a questionable concept. In line with the aforementioned characterisation of ‘anti-
Semitism’, ‘Islamophobia’ is defined as aversion to Muslims based on negative stereotypes 
and prejudice against Muslims. Stereotypes which Ineke van der Valk examines in her study 
on contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia in the Netherlands are that Muslims are 
aggressive, unreliable, misogynist, and intolerant (van der Valk 2012, 118–119; cf. Esposito 
and Kalin 2011; de Koning 2016).
Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are multi-dimensional concepts (cf. Cesari 2006; 
Julius 2012). A distinction could be made between religious, social, political, and economic 
dimensions. The religious dimension refers to religion-based hostility towards Jews or 
Muslims and the social dimension refers to expressions of hostility in the social domain 
(population groups, education, football stadiums or media). The political dimension 
encompasses political movements and parties focusing on marginalising the position of 
Jews or Muslims in society and restricting their rights, while the economic dimension refers 
to the discrimination of Muslims or Jews in, for instance, the labour market.
There are differences and commonalities in the current manifestations of anti-Semitism 
and Islamophobia in the Netherlands. A striking difference between these phenomena is that 
Islamophobia is politically organised, in contrast to anti-Semitism. In the Dutch Parliament, 
the PVV presents itself explicitly as an anti-Islam party directed at ‘de-islamising’ Dutch 
society (PVV 2017). There is no comparable anti-Semitic party in Parliament. Furthermore, 
many Dutch Muslims feel they suffer discrimination regarding employment opportunities; 
one in three says s/he has felt this at least once in the past year (Andriessen, Fernee, and 
Wittebrood 2014, 77). To which degree Dutch Jews are confronted with this is unknown. 
In the wake of the lethal anti-Semitic attacks in Belgium and France in 2014, 2015, and 
2016, Jewish buildings in the Netherlands received extra police protection. Recent research 
indicates that, during the last ten years, more than one in three (39%) of all mosques in the 
Netherlands have been targets of aggression, such as arson attempts, graffiti, vandalism, 
and threats (cf. van der Valk 2015a, 149).
Scholarly Approaches
Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are comparable social phenomena which can be fruitfully 
approached from the perspective of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1974; Brown 2000; 
Wimmer 2008; Baumann and Gingrich 2004). This theory approaches these phenomena as 
the outcome of processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’. It assumes that, in social life, people tend 
to make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or, more definitively, between the collectivity 
or group they consider to belong to and the collectivity or group they regard not to belong 
to. This social categorisation assists individuals in creating a self-image and finding a place 
in life. Social identity is part of someone’s self-image which derives from the knowledge 
of belonging to a group and the emotional value which is attached to this. People tend to 
attribute more positive qualifications to the in-group than to the out-group.
According to Social Identity Theory, the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’ will increase and 
people will be more inclined to stigmatise ‘the other’ and attach negative qualifications to the 
out-group if they feel threatened by that group (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Koomen 
and van der Pligt 2016, 37–73). Three types of (perceived) threats can be distinguished: 
realistic threat, symbolic threat, and social threat. The concept of realistic threat includes 
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socio-economic threat, but also the threat that people experience through vandalism, 
aggression, crime, and potential acts of terrorism. Symbolic threat is rooted in conflicting 
values and beliefs. The category of social threat encompasses threats to social position 
and group esteem (cf. Koomen and van der Pligt 2016, 41–47). These three types of threat 
can all contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and prejudice against the 
out-group. In the case of Jews or Muslims, such a development results in anti-Semitism 
or Islamophobia. Research emphasises that emotions play a significant role in the rise of 
prejudice, especially fear and anger (Miller, Smith, and Mackie 2004). More factors, such 
as catalyst events, ideology, leadership figures, and context, have influence (Koomen and 
van der Pligt 2016, 12–36). Ideologies can justify stereotypes and prejudice and offer them 
a more solid basis (cf. Allen 2010, 160–185).
Social Identity Theory hardly pays attention to the impact of institutional actors and the 
context on these processes. It is the merit of the Resource Mobilisation Theory in drawing 
attention to the role of institutions in particular (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004). From this perspective, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiments are 
not phenomena which arise spontaneously in society but are at least partly the product of 
agitation activities of anti-Semitic movements or anti-Islam groups, such as the PVV in the 
Netherlands. Their interests, strategies, and tactics can have a major impact. Moreover, these 
phenomena never appear in a social vacuum but in a specific context. Contextual actors can 
stimulate or slow down the upsurge of anti-Semitism or Islamophobia. Significant actors 
are political authorities and the media which not only report about news related to Jews 
and Muslims but also frame them positively, negatively or in a nuanced way (cf. EUMC 
2002; Esposito and Kalin 2011).
Context: three features
As stated above, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents always occur within a specific 
context and can thus only be understood in relation to that context. What characterises the 
current Dutch context? Three features, which are interconnected, appear to be of particular 
importance.
The first feature is the genesis of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society and especially 
the rise of religion as an identity marker for and of ethnic minorities in this society. The 
Netherlands has never been a homogenously composed society, but due to immigration 
since the Second World War, ethnic and cultural diversity has increased. Particularly since 
the 1960s, considerable numbers of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco as well as from 
other parts of the world have come to the Netherlands, resulting in a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural society. Currently, the Dutch population represents over 200 nationalities. The 
number of Jews in the Netherlands is estimated to be 50,000—predominantly halachic Jews 
and what are often referred to as ‘father-Jews’2—and the number of Muslims is thought to 
be 900,000, which represents approximately 5.8% of the total Dutch population (Wallet and 
Berg 2010, 12; Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012, 44–45). It is striking that, since the late 1980s, 
religion has increasingly become an identity marker for and of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands (Sengers and Sunier 2010). In particular, Dutch citizens who hail from Morocco 
and Turkey define themselves and are defined by others decreasingly in ethnic terms and 
increasingly in religious terms as Muslims (Peters and Vellenga 2007). A consequence of 
the ‘religionisation’ of the identity of these immigrant groups is that, in the expression of 
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aversion to them, the religious dimension has also become more important, with the result 
of an increase of Islamophobia.
The second feature is the transformation of the dominant Dutch national self-image and, 
related to that, the place Jews and Muslims take within the renewed national self-image. The 
term ‘national self-image’ refers to the prevailing images in the Netherlands of what Dutch 
society is and, more importantly, what Dutch society should be (cf. Anderson 2006; Lechner 
2008; Vellenga 2015). Since the turn of the century and under the influence of the ‘Fortuyn 
revolt’,3 the dominant national self-image of the Netherlands as a multicultural society 
has been transformed into the image of the Netherlands as a progressive, predominately 
secular society. The Netherlands is not considered any longer to be a multicultural society 
in which traditional and progressive identities exist side by side, but is now more defined as 
a progressive society in which values are dominant, such as individual freedom, freedom of 
speech, gender equality, equality between heterosexuals and homosexuals, equal relations 
between children and parents, and animal welfare. Moreover, the Netherlands is considered 
to be a predominately secular society, in which citizens have the right to express their 
religious identities in the public sphere, but in which this sphere is considered to be secular 
(cf. Houtman and Duyvendak 2009; van Dam and van Trigt 2015).
This shift in the national self-image has direct consequences for the positions of Jews 
and Muslims within Dutch society (Sengers and Sunier 2010). Within the concept of 
multiculturalism, all religious–ethnic minorities were included in Dutch society and 
considered to belong to it. Since the 1950s, the Jewish minority has held a specific position 
within this society. Because of the horrors Jews had experienced during the Second World 
War and the feelings of guilt that many Dutch felt about that, they were considered to be, 
in the words of the historian Bart Wallet, “the conscience of the nation” (Wallet 2014). 
However, with the transformation to a progressive and mainly secular society, a relatively 
new order has arisen in which especially traditional religious minorities are perceived to 
hold positions not in the centre but at the margins of Dutch society. In particular, Muslim 
communities are seen to propagate traditional values which are supposed to be incompatible 
with the dominant progressive values of Dutch culture and it is expected that they assimilate 
(Peters and Vellenga 2007; Houtman and Duyvendak 2009). Their position on the periphery 
is accompanied by experiences of deprivation and discrimination. Within the renewed 
order, Jews—in particular, secular and liberal Jews—hold a position in or near the centre 
of Dutch society, although Orthodox Jews noticed during the debate in the Dutch House 
of Representatives on unstunned ritual slaughter in 2011 that their position is not taken 
for granted any longer in Dutch society (Vellenga 2015; Wallet 2014).
The third feature that characterises the context of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents 
is the trend of globalisation, which can be described as “the expansion and intensification 
of social relations and consciousness across world-time and world-place” as important in 
the Netherlands (Steger 2009, 15). This trend has acquired a strong impetus during the last 
decades through the increase of immigration from non-Western countries, the growth 
of international mobility and tourism, the ongoing rise of the mass media, the ‘Internet 
revolution’, and the emergence of social media. One consequence of this development 
is a growing diversity in opinions within the Dutch population regarding international 
conflicts, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and in loyalties to the parties involved 
in these conflicts. A second consequence is that people are more rapidly and probably 
better informed about international conflicts which have high newsworthiness. Due to these 
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effects, foreign conflicts, such as the Middle East conflict, can far more easily result in an 
increase of tensions in the relations between groups which support Israel or the Palestinians, 
which, as will be demonstrated further in this article, contribute to the rise of Islamophobic 
and anti-Semitic incidents in the Netherlands (cf. Whine 2003; Esposito and Kalin 2011).
Trends
The question of the increase of the numbers of expressions of (social) anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia in the Netherlands since the turn of the century is not easy to answer accurately 
because the measurement of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic expressions is a very complex 
issue. Actually, there are no longitudinal measurements of these expressions, but only long-
term measurements of notifications of these expressions. However, the notifications are 
influenced by more factors than just the expressions involved. The numbers of notifications are, 
for example, also influenced by the level of publicity the registration points enjoy among the 
wider public, opinions about the usefulness of reporting an incident or inaccurate registration 
by the (police) services, for example, by registering swastikas on mosques as anti-Semitic 
instead of Islamophobic expressions, as was the case before 2014 (cf. van der Valk 2017, 15).
A number of sources are available in the Netherlands which can cumulatively provide 
an indication of probably not so much the real numbers of expressions, but of at least the 
development of the numbers of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents over the last 15 
years. A distinction can be made between sources concerning notifications of incidents on 
the Internet and sources concerning notifications of other types of incidents, such as ‘real life’ 
incidents (e.g. verbal threats, graffiti, arson), incidents in specific societal domains (e.g. offensive 
remarks in the media, derisive singing in football stadiums), and incidents related to work 
(e.g. discrimination in the labour market, bullying at work). Concerning the first category, the 
annual reports of Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet (MDI—Notification Point Discrimination 
Internet) are very useful and, concerning the second category, several sources offer useful 
information. With regard to anti-Semitism, the annual reports of the Centrum Informatie en 
Documentatie Israel (CIDI—Centre for Information and Documentation Israel) are relevant, as 
are several periodical research reports on racism and extremism in the Netherlands, published 
by Leiden University, the Anne Frank Foundation, and the Verwey–Jonker Institute.
Islamophobia is less well documented. However, some of the reports mentioned 
above on racism and extremism offer data regarding Islamophobia. In recent years, van 
der Valk has collated a lot of data from different individual sources about Islamophobia 
in four publications (van der Valk 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2017). Notwithstanding the lack 
of an established, longstanding notification point for the registration of Islamophobic 
incidents, as the CIDI is for anti-Semitic incidents, in recent years, there have been several 
Islamophobia notification points in the Netherlands, such as Meldpunt tegen Islamofobie 
en Discriminatie (Notification Point against Islamophobia and Discrimination, see www.
meldpunt-islamofobie.nl, accessed 15 September 2017), Al Nisa (see islamofobie@alnisa.nl, 
accessed 15 September 2017), and Meldpunt islamofobie (Notification Point Islamophobia, 
in particular on Facebook). These new initiatives differ in professionalism and it is not 
always clear how they use the term ‘Islamophobia’ (see http://www.republiekallochtonie.
nl/islamofobie-moslimhaat, accessed 15 September 2017). In 2016, a joint report of police 
and anti-discrimination offices with data on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in 2014 and 
2015 were issued (Politie 2015).
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Notifications of anti-Semitic incidents (except those on the Internet)
The oldest source is the CIDI which has published anti-Semitic cases since the early 1990s. 
The annual reports in the 1990s outline a modest annual increase in the number of incidents, 
with the exception of 1996 and 1998 when the number remained constant. These reports do 
not provide figures about the total number of incidents, in contrast to the annual reports 
since 2000.
Notifications of Islamophobic incidents (except those on the Internet)
The Annex of the sixth report of the monitor Racisme en extremisme (van Donselaar and 
Rodrigues 2004b, 3) shows that, in the month after the murder of Theo van Gogh, on 2 
November 2004, 174 violent incidents were noted, including 104 anti-Muslim incidents 
and 47 attacks on mosques. The monitor Derde rapportage racisme, anti-Semitisme en 
extreemrechts geweld in Nederland mentions that, according to Dutch police records, in 
total, 150 incidents of Muslim discrimination were registered in 2013, which comprised 
115 incidents of use of insulting language and 35 incidents of intentional discrimination 
(Tierolf, Hermens, and Drost 2014, 48). Van der Valk’s overview Islamofobie en discriminatie 
reveals that, in 2005, 2007, and 2008, the most violent acts against mosques were noted (van 
der Valk 2012, 78). A recent research project, conducted by Stichting Platform Islamitische 
Organisaties Rijnmond (SPIOR—Platform for Islamic Organisations in Rijnmond), shows 
that Islamophobia as perceived by Muslims in the region of Rotterdam is much more 
widespread than registered by the relevant authorities (SPIOR 2016).
Table 1. CiDi statistics on registered anti-Semitic incidents, 2000–2015.
note: in its reports, the CiDi used to make a distinction between the following categories of anti-Semitism: real life incidents, 
incident in the immediate vicinity, written expressions, and societal domain, such as sports and demonstrations.
Source: http://www.cidi.nl/sectie/anti-Semitisme/cidi-anti-Semitismemonitor/, accessed 15 September 2017.
2000  96 2004 336 2008 108 2012  96
2001 139 2005 159 2009 167 2013 100
2002 359 2006 261 2010 124 2014 171
2003 334 2007 104 2011 112 2015 126
Table 2. monitor racism and extremism statistics on registered anti-Semitic incidents, 1997–2013.
athe figures concerning 2010–2013 have been taken from Derde rapportage racisme, anti-Semitisme en extreemrechts 
geweld in Nederland (tierolf, Hermens, and Drost 2014). in this report, a distinction is made between anti-Semitic 
scolding and intentional anti-Semitism where the perpetrator is well aware of the Jewish identity of the victim. the 
reported figures concern the last category.
Source: van Donselaar and rodrigues 2003, 27; van Donselaar and rodrigues 2006, 80; van Donselaar and rodrigues 2008, 
35; rodrigues and van Donselaar 2010, 31; tierolf, Hermens, and Drost 2014, 33.
1997  9 2004  – 2009 18
1998  8 2005 41 2010 19a
2001 18 2006 35 2011 30
2002 46 2007 21 2012 58
2003 39 2008 14 2013 61
Table 3. monitor racism and extremism statistics on registered islamophobic incidents, 2002–2009.
Source: van Donselaar and rodrigues 2004a, 32; van Donselaar and rodrigues 2006, 96; van Donselaar and rodrigues 2008, 
35; rodrigues and van Donselaar 2010, 31.
2002 68 2006 62
2003 59 2007 82
2004 – 2008 89
2005 70 2009 52
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Notifications of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents on the Internet
What image do the data provide about the development of the numbers of notified incidents 
of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands? In summary, firstly, the general 
level of the annual numbers of recorded expressions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is 
higher than that before 2000–2001. We thus observe an increase of these forms of out-group 
hostility. This observation is in line with both Michael Whine’s statement that October 2000 
proved to be a watershed with regard to anti-Semitic incidents in Britain (Whine 2003, 31) 
and with the observation by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC) that
Islamic communities and other vulnerable groups have become a target of increased hostility 
since 11 September. A greater sense of fear among the general population has exacerbated 
already existing prejudices and fuelled acts of aggression and harassment in many European 
Member States. (EUMC 2002, 5)
Secondly, at the same time, there are considerable fluctuations in the numbers of notified 
incidents per year. Regarding anti-Semitism, the peak was in the period 2002–2004 and, 
regarding Islamophobia, in the period 2004–2008. Subsequently the numbers decreased. 
Therefore, an uninterrupted ascending curve is not observed, but a development with peaks 
and troughs. In 2014, the number of recorded expressions of anti-Semitism increased, while, 
in 2015, the number of registered incidents of Islamophobia rose exponentially.4
Thirdly, insofar as data about the perpetrators of the incidents are available, they show 
conclusively that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are no longer exclusively a matter 
of the ‘radical right’, which was the case in the 1990s, but are also manifest in other sections 
of the population. Islamophobia is further noticed among the constituency of populist 
nationalist parties and on an even broader scale, while anti-Semitism is rife in, among 
others, Turkish–Dutch and Moroccan–Dutch Islamic communities.5
Table 4.  mDi statistics on registered anti-Semitic and islamophobic incidents on the internet, 1998–
2015.
Source: http://www.meldpunt.nl/site/page.php?lang=&pageiD=34, accessed 15 September 2017.
Year Anti-Semitism Islamophobia
1998  31 –
2000 203 –
2001 197 125
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Factors
How can we understand these developments? What factors have contributed to them? 
The focus hereinafter will be on the manifestations of these trends in the aforementioned 
‘new’ categories or, to be more precise, on anti-Semitism in (a section of) Muslims and 
on Islamophobia in the constituency of Dutch populist nationalist parties since 2000. The 
factors described should be understood against the background of the theoretical approach 
and context which have already been sketched.
Following the Belgian sociologists Dirk Jacobs and colleagues, a distinction should be 
made between seeking an explanation for, on the one hand, the higher level of anti-Semitic 
and Islamophobic expressions in general since 2000 and, on the other hand, fluctuations 
in the registered expressions since then (Jacobs et al. 2011). These fluctuations are strongly 
related to, as will be illustrated, outbursts of violence in the Middle East and acts of violence 
committed in the name of Islam in the West.
With regard to fluctuations in the development of registered anti-Semitic expressions, the 
data pinpoint a clear parallel between the increase of these expressions and violent incidents 
and wars in which Israel has been involved, such as the Second Intifada (2000–2005), the 
military operation in Lebanon (2006), and the Gaza Wars (2008–2009, 2012, 2014). Every 
time the Middle East conflict escalated, the number of anti-Semitic incidents peaked and 
every time a conflict ceased, the number of incidents decreased. There is a clear statistical 
link between violent events in the Middle East and acts of anti-Semitism in the Netherlands.
Annual reports of the CIDI indicate that the perpetrators of Middle East-related anti-
Semitic incidents have, as far as is known, different backgrounds—some are non-Muslim, 
others are Muslim. An example of incidents perpetrated by Muslims is the pro-Gaza 
demonstration in The Hague on 24 July 2014, where Muslim youth waving ISIS flags shouted 
“Death to Israel, death to Jews” (NOS 2014). The research report by Ron van Wonderen 
and Willem Wagenaar on anti-Semitism among Dutch youth shows that 2% of all Christian 
and all non-believing youth and 12% of all Muslim youth do not think ‘so positively’ about 
Jews in the Netherlands (van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 27). Among the youth who do 
not think ‘so positively’ about Dutch Jews, 7% of the Christian, 13% of the non-believers, 
and 36% of the Muslims mentioned that this was due to the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians (van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 37).
In relation to upsurges of Islamophobia, violent acts committed in the name of Islam in 
the West work as catalysts, such as the events of 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004), 
the London bombings (2005), and the bloody attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2014, 
2016). These events lead to a strong increase in the number of Islamophobic incidents. It 
appears that the perpetrators blame Muslims in general for what Muslim extremists have 
done.
Why have there been more incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the 
Netherlands in general from 2000 onwards and why does the Middle East conflict in 
particular trigger anti-Semitism and violent attacks in the name of Islam? Interpreted 
from the perspective of Social Identity Theory, these phenomena are manifestations of the 
polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and negative out-group attitudes. According to this 
theory, this polarisation is strongly promoted by the factor of perceived (realistic, symbolic 
or social) threat. The theory assumes that, if people feel threatened, they tend to close ranks 
and stigmatise ‘the other’ (cf. Schuyt 2006; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006).
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With respect to Islamophobia, the most plausible explanation for the peaks in the 
registered numbers is simply that the perpetrators of Islamophobic incidents feel threatened 
by the violent acts of jihadists and blame Muslims in general for these acts (cf. D’Haenens 
and Bink 2007). However, regarding the rise of the general level of Islamophobia in society, 
realistic threat is probably not the only factor, possibly not even the most prominent factor. 
In addition to realistic threat, the symbolic and social threat which a section of the native 
population experiences with regard to Muslims is important. Many Dutch people assume 
that the alleged core values of Islam and Dutch culture are incompatible, in particular 
regarding issues such as the relationships between men and women, homosexuality, freedom 
of expression, and tolerance, and they fear that the perceived original Dutch culture will 
disappear with the rise of Islam (Peters and Vellenga 2007). Moreover, many Dutch people 
fear that they are losing the country they feel they belong to, due to the emergence of a 
particularly large Muslim community.6 The Dutch historian Piet de Rooy wrote after the 
killing of Theo van Gogh that
There was a community of about one million people in Dutch society that actually did not fit 
in and possibly did not even want to fit in. The feeling that the old country had gone widely 
prevailed. (de Rooy 2005, 11; translated by the author)
Moreover, according to many Dutch, the government does not really acknowledge this 
problem, let alone challenge it adequately. They have less confidence in the government 
and talk about politicians in terms of ‘careerists’ and ‘shameless profiteers’ who do not stand 
for the interests of the native Dutch population and who ignore the considerable problems 
related to immigration and multicultural society (cf. Houtman and Duyvendak 2009).
How does the factor of ‘perceived threat’ contribute to anti-Semitism among (a section 
of the) Muslim communities? It is not likely that the group which is the main target of 
anti-Semitic expressions, namely Dutch Jews, is generally perceived by Muslims as a serious 
symbolic, social or realistic threat, if only because of its very modest size. Moreover, violent 
attacks by Jews on Muslims are non-existent in the Netherlands.
Although Muslims do not likely feel threatened by Dutch Jews, many of them still feel 
disadvantaged in Dutch society; this feeling of threat can also contribute to anti-Semitism. 
Research indicates that many Muslims feel discriminated against and marginalised in Dutch 
society and, related to that, they feel that in many situations they are not treated equally to 
other groups and that double standards are applied (cf. Andriessen, Fernee, and Wittebrood 
2014, 77; Gans 2017). Some even believe that the West, including the Netherlands, opposes 
Islam and seeks to destroy it (cf. Slootman and Tillie 2006). How does this feeling of threat 
contribute to anti-Semitism?
There are at least two ways in which the perceived deprived position of Muslims in 
Dutch society likely affects their attitudes to Jews and anti-Semitism. It is known that many 
Muslims have feelings of solidarity with the Palestinians and thus harbour anti-Israel and 
anti-Jewish sentiments. They feel politically and probably religiously (‘they are our brothers’) 
connected to the Palestinians and consider Jews, including Dutch Jews, to be complicit in the 
oppression of the Palestinians by Israel (cf. Klug 2005, 58). These feelings are intensified by 
the fact that they recognize their own deprived situation in the Palestinian–Israel relations. 
Therefore, they feel not only particular loyalty to the Palestinians but also particular aversion 
to Israel and, as a consequence, sometimes aversion to Jews. This point is supported by the 
research project on anti-Semitism among Dutch Muslim youth, conducted by van Wonderen 
and Wagenaar, which shows a correlation between them feeling discriminated against and 
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disadvantaged and thinking ‘less positively’ about Jews, the state of Israel, and Zionists (van 
Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 51).7
The feeling of being threatened may affect the phenomenon of anti-Semitism among 
Muslims in another way. In the Netherlands, anti-Semitism is highly taboo. While it has 
certainly never completely disappeared in post-war society, the overwhelming majority of 
the Dutch population condemns anti-Semitism with great conviction (cf. Gans 2010; Ensel 
2014; Ensel and Gans 2017). By expressing anti-Semitic sentiments, the Muslim perpetrators 
of these expressions attempt to provoke the society they feel at odds with. They know that 
anti-Semitism is a taboo in the Netherlands, so they can target the Dutch by breaking this 
taboo. This provocative behaviour is clearly visible in the activities of the Moroccan-Dutch 
rapper Appa (Maghreb.NL 2015) and the Belgium activist Dyab Abou Jahjah, the founder of 
the Arabic European League (AEL) (Dyab Abou Jahjah 2017a, b), leader of the Movement 
X and well-known in the Netherlands, who declared themselves as anti-Semitic in order to 
challenge the current interpretation of the right of freedom of speech. According to them, it 
should be forbidden to slander Allah and the Prophet and to insult Muslims and they attempt 
to demonstrate the supposed double standards regarding the right of freedom of expression 
by voicing controversial anti-Semitic statements. However, this behaviour is likely more 
widespread. In the research on anti-Semitism among Dutch youth, van Wonderen and 
Wagenaar state that Muslim youth in particular who do not think ‘so positively’ about Jews 
in the Netherlands have the feeling that “with regard to different forms of discrimination in 
the Netherlands as well as the Dutch image of the Middle East conflict, double standards 
are being used” (van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 8).
The factor of threat or fear is crucial. However, what are the forces that influence this 
factor? As mentioned, Resource Mobilisation Theory outlines that fear or discontent usually 
does not well up spontaneously in society, but is (partly) the result of mobilisation and 
framing activities undertaken by institutions, movements, and the media, which have an 
interest in this. This appears to be the case for Islamophobia. The existing fear of Muslims 
and Islam among the Dutch population is not only fertile ground for the current anti-
Islam movement but, conversely, is also nourished by this movement and especially by its 
most important representative: the PVV. Just after the turn of the century, the flamboyant 
politician Pim Fortuyn succeeded in mobilising ‘angry citizens’ by focusing on their 
discontent about immigration, multicultural society, and Islam and, after his assassination 
in 2002, he was succeeded by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and subsequently Geert Wilders. From 2006, 
Geert Wilders and his PVV party have been fighting continuously against the alleged threat 
of Islamisation (Peters and Vellenga 2007). They have a direct interest in the continuation of 
the presence of this sentiment within the Dutch population, as it justifies their existence in 
politics and is one of the main pillars of their electoral success. This factor does not appear 
to play a prominent role regarding anti-Semitism. There are no anti-Semitic parties in the 
Dutch Parliament; indeed, in the Dutch political arena, anti-Semitism is widely rejected.
What is significant with respect to anti-Semitism is the influence of international actors 
and media. Anti-Semitic sentiments in the Netherlands and other European countries 
are not only stimulated by the propaganda of radical and extremist Islamic groups, such 
as Al Qaeda or ISIS, but also by Arabic, Turkish, and North-African broadcasters and 
Internet forums. They increase feelings among the Muslims in Western countries of being 
threatened and they portray Israel and Jews constantly and exclusively in negative terms 
(Webman 2010, 2012; Jikeli 2015, 229–235). They view Israel as an imperialistic state and 
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the Jews as conspirators striving for world domination. Through satellite dishes and the 
Internet, this kind of stigmatisation enters the houses of immigrant families who hail from 
Islamic countries. Research reveals, however, that Muslim youth in the Netherlands orientate 
themselves not only in relation to these media, but also in relation to a wide range of media 
sources, significantly more frequently and intensively than non-Muslim youth (Konijn et 
al. 2010).
Conclusion
In the Netherlands, the general level of the annual numbers of recorded incidents of anti-
Semitism and Islamophobia has increased since 2000 and, at the same time, there have 
been significant fluctuations in the numbers of notified incidents per year. The fluctuations 
correlate to outbursts of violence in the Middle East and to acts of violence committed in 
the name of Islam in the West. The increase of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia relates to 
real, symbolic, and social threats experienced in the context of Dutch multi-ethnic society, 
changes in national identity, and trends in globalisation. Because of these trends, regional 
conflicts like the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have a bigger effect on the relation between 
population groups in other parts of the world.
Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia should not be considered as completely separate 
phenomena (cf. Renton and Gidley 2017; Bunzl 2007; Silverstein 2008). Further, they 
can reinforce each other, creating a downward spiral in which tensions increase, possibly 
resulting in violence directed at Jews or Muslims or both. Anti-Semitism perpetrated by 
people with an Islamic background can stimulate aversion to Muslims among Jews and 
other Dutch citizens; conversely, Islamophobia can contribute to aversion to Dutch society 
among Muslims in the Netherlands and activate a section of them to protest against this 
society by expressing anti-Semitic sentiments. This is what Evelien Gans draws attention 
to when she writes:
Islamophobia and the feeling among Muslims that double standards are applied may tend to 
provoke more antisemitism, which leads to more Islamophobia—a spiralling movement that 
is not exclusive to Muslims. (Gans 2017, 524)
Notes
1.  A recent survey conducted by the PEW Research Center shows that the Netherlands is certainly 
not the only European country which has to deal with anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. The 
survey provides an overview of antipathy towards Jews and Muslims in six European Union 
countries: Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Thirteen per cent 
of all Europeans studied voiced negative sentiments about Jews. The strongest anti-Semitic 
sentiment was found in Poland, where 28% of respondents said they had an unfavorable 
opinion of Jews. The anti-Muslim sentiment was substantially more widespread. One in 
three of all respondents (33%) holds negative opinions on Muslims. Anti-Muslim views were 
particularly prevalent among Italians (61%). The lowest percentage of anti-Muslim sentiment 
was found in the UK (19%). (Stokes 2015, 21–22)
2.  The term ‘father-Jews’ refers to the offspring of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother. In 
contrast to the offspring of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father, they are not recognized 
as Jews by Jewish law (Halacha).
3.  ‘Fortuyn revolt’ refers to the radical change within the Dutch political system under the 
influence of the meteoric rise of the charismatic figure of Pim Fortuyn in the Dutch political 
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firmament in the early 2000s. Fortuyn claimed to be the ‘real leader’ of the ‘ordinary people’ 
and promised to make every effort to defend Dutch sovereignty against the threat of the 
‘Islamisation’ of Dutch society. On 6 May 2002, he was assassinated by an animal rights 
activist. Despite this tragedy, his party decided to pursue its candidacy in the elections nine 
days later, which proved a great success for the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF). It won 26 of the 150 
seats, becoming the second largest party in parliament after the Christian Democrats. Pim 
Fortuyn and the LPF broke open the Dutch political system and paved the way for so-called 
‘populism’ in the Netherlands.
4.  This conclusion is confirmed by data recorded by the Dutch police in 2014 and 2015; the 
police also registered an increase in the number of anti-Semitic incidents in 2015 (Politie 
2015, 68). For the most recent information on Islamophobia in the Netherlands, see van der 
Valk’s report Monitor Moslim Discriminatie: Derde rapportage (van der Valk 2017) which 
confirms the strong increase in Islamophobic incidents in 2015.
5.  Research conducted by Ruud Koopmans shows that anti-Semitism is not only over-represented 
among Muslims in the Netherlands, but also in five other European countries: Germany, 
France, Belgium, Austria, and Sweden. A survey in these six countries revealed that 9% of 
native Christians are overtly anti-Semitic and agree that Jews cannot be trusted, whereas 
45% of Muslims endorse this opinion. According to Koopmans, anti-Semitism in Europe is, 
in particular, correlated to the degree of religious fundamentalism. Multivariate regression 
analysis shows that demographic and socio-economic variables are less important predictors 
of out-group hostility. (Koopmans 2015).
6.  This is confirmed by social psychological research which revealed that prejudice towards 
Muslims in the Netherlands is predominately influenced by experienced symbolic threat, 
not by realistic threat (González et al. 2008).
7.  The connection made in this explanation between anti-Israel and anti-Jewish sentiments in 
certain Muslim circles and Muslims’ experience of having a threatened position in society is 
supported by the interpretations of Nathalie Debrauwere-Miller and Ethan Katz of Middle 
East-related anti-Semitic incidents in France perpetrated by Muslims. Debrauwere-Miller 
states that many young Muslims in France strongly identify with the Palestinians in this 
conflict, due to that fact that they see the struggle of the Palestinians as a symbol for their 
own exclusion in France (Debrauwere-Miller 2010, 11). In addition, Ethan Katz argues that 
many Muslim immigrants and their children face persistent discrimination in French society 
and continuously struggle to integrate successfully. In particular, since the 1990s, they “have 
seen the suffering of the Palestinian people not simply as a case of fellow Arabs suffering, 
but as a powerful metaphor for their own struggles in France. Correspondingly, they regard 
French Jews’ increasingly visible support for Israel, like these Jews’ greater ‘Frenchness’, as 
a sign of Jewish identification with the imperialist oppressors of innocent Muslim victims.” 
(Katz 2015, 320)
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